An Issue Primer

What's Up

In 2003, America was debating whether or not we should’ve gone into Iraq. 2004 and 2005 switched to discussions of how well/poorly regime change was going.

Now, with everyone agreeing all is not well in the fertile crescent, the big Iraq questions are a) how we can fix the mess, and/or b) how can we get out?

The president's surge

In January 2007, the president first proposed increasing troop strength in Iraq to create enough security in Baghdad to allow political progress and development get back on track. The surge would spell 20,000 more troops (which could translate to a total increase in military personnel of 30,000 (WP) to 48,000 (CBO)), which started trickling in in February with the last troops arriving in June (WP).

A May progress report (pdf) from the Pentagon and July report from the White House said early results were, at best, a mixed bag. A much anticipated September report from General Petraeus (pdf) was slightly rosier, but didn't convince everyone, including the GAO which gave a less optimistic report card around the same time. (See our comparison of both reports.) The general word by the end of '07, however, was that surge was bringing down violence - although political progress wasn't necessarily following as planned. Either way the surge is spun, it's almost certain to see its end in 2008, with the administration suggesting troop numbers could get down to 130,000 or 100,000 (down from a September high of 160,000). (WP).

Congressional skirmishes

Dems were no fan of the surge; they'd rather see the war come to an end, and - in '07 - took every opportunity they could get to vote for a withdrawal.

Round 1: After playing around with symbolic votes against the surge (WP and WP) in early '07, Congress tried using a $100 billion supplemental war funding bill (which bloated up with sweeteners to $124 billion - WP), to set goals for progress in Iraq and a timeline for the US's departure. That bill got vetoed by the president, who objected to its price tag as well as to its forced timeline for withdrawal. Congress ended up meeting the White House half way, okaying a war funding bill for '07, HR 2206, that only included benchmarks that the Iraq government would have to meet in order to keep getting reconstruction funds. (WP)

Round 2: In July, the House voted again to set a timeline for withdrawal (but with numbers that couldn't override an almost certain veto - WP), while Senate leaders pulled all-nighters to try to pass a bill that would bring most troops home by May, 2008 (they failed, but at the same time they didn't bring less far-reaching bills to the floor which may have had a better chance at passage - WP).

September: The benchmarks set in HR 2206 came up in September, when the administration gave Congress an optimistic report on the success of the surge, at the same time saying it would start bringing troop numbers down. Congressional Dems were unimpressed and quickly volleyed back with new measures - to tack on to the defense authorization bill - that would bring troops back faster and/or alter the US mission in Iraq. The stumbling block to any action, though, was still the Senate, where any controversial bill needs 60 out of 100 senators' votes to pass. So far Dems and moderate Republicans have failed to find a bill they can both vote on. The most promising action lined up would require troops get equal time home to Iraq duty, but that failed the week of September 17.

November: After taking a break from Iraq skirmishes in October, Congress tried to use a $50 "bridge fund" for Iraq to demand that Bush outline a plan to bring back the troops by December '08 (except for troops needed to fight terrorism and train Iraqis). Even though the measure was milder than earlier bills - setting a "goal" instead of a "deadline," it was killed in the Senate. (WP) Congress similarly wimped out when they ultimately gave Bush $70 billion for Iraq and Afghanistan in December. (WP)

2008: With a shaky economy eclipsing the country's attention, Iraq has fallen out of the spotlight on Capitol Hill. Nonetheless, the week of February 25, senators plan to vote on a couple of - almost certain to fail - Iraq measures, one which would stop funding troop deployments in four months time. Another, which could pass, would symbolically ask the president to come up with a plan with 60 days to fight global terrorism.

The debate

Politicians, theorists, military specialists and pundits are all over the map on the Iraq question. Some say the political and moral consequences of leaving are so dire – civil war, possible regional war, ethnic cleansing, increased terrorism, etc. – that the US has to pull out all the stops to put Humpty Dumpty back together again. Others say our presence in Iraq only makes the situation worse and that we should get out as fast as we can. Most fall somewhere in between.

Rather than do a pro/con of the solutions being proposed, cJ thought what would be handier would be to lay out the problem – to help our readers put the different plans out there in perspective.

The links above provide a cheat sheet on the state of Iraq, mostly cribbed from the Iraq Study Group, but also with bits from the International Crisis Group and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. We haven't updated this overview since early 2007, so our readers may also want to check out the White House's September update (pdf), as well as the GAO's progress report and the Independent Commission on the Security Forces in Iraq (see the WP's summary and our comparison of the White House and GAO reports).

in a nutshell

Everyone agrees Iraq is a mess. They also agree Iraq has three mammoth problems – a political one, a security one and a governance one.

Politically, three main ethnic groups (and factions within those groups) are far from being on the same page when it comes to where their government is and where it should be going. Those political problems are almost impossible to grapple with – and largely made worse – while insurgents, militias, terrorists, criminals and, increasingly, average Iraqis all add to escalating violence and division within the country. The political and security messes make the third problem – providing services and supporting development for Iraq’s people and economy – almost a non-starter.

On the following pages, we spell out the political, security and governance situation. But since most – if not all – political divisions and violence in Iraq fall along ethnic lines, the first step to grasping the state of Iraq is getting the ethnic who’s who.

next > the ethnic divide

Updated February 25, 2008

Did we miss something, let some slant slip in, lose a link - or do you just have something to say? Drop a line below! In the spirit of open dialogue, cJ asks you keep it civil, keep it real and keep it focused on the message, not the messenger. See our policy page for more on what that all means.